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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
In 1938, the original designers of the Superman comic book figure
assigned their ownership rights to DC Comics for $130. 1 On January 1,
2013, their heirs plan to reclaim those rights in court. 2 The impending

* Attorney, Karr Tuttle Campbell; J.D., University of Washington School of Law; B.A.,
Biochemistry, Columbia University. The author would like to extend special thanks to
Clark C. Shores, Gail Dykstra, and Prof. Robert Gomulkiewicz for their inspiration and
invaluable feedback.
1

See Scott M. Hervey, Superman and a Super Copyright Battle, WEINTRAUB GENSHLEA
CHEDIAK L. CORP. (Apr. 2, 2008), http://weintraub.com/Publications/Super
man_and_a_Super_Copyright_Battle.
2

See Nikki Finke, Why Is DC/WB Vendetta Against Superman Copyright Lawyer Relying
on Stolen Files?, DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD (June 14, 2011, 4:08 PM),
http://www.deadline.com/2011/06/attorney-marc-toberoffs-appeal-denied-as-part-of-dccomics-warner-bros-suit/.
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Superman litigation will herald a wave of a new type of action, known as
copyright termination. The Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”) 3
granted the original authors of creative works the right to recover rights
assigned to publishers, media companies, and other parties, after a period
of thirty-five years. 4 Since the Copyright Act became effective on January
1, 1978, 5 the original authors may first assert their termination rights on
January 1, 2013.
[2]
Consider in conjunction a seemingly unrelated issue that has
simmered for many decades: when a university professor creates a
copyrightable work such as an article, a book, or a computer program,
absent any kind of contractual arrangement, does the work belong to the
professor or to the university? Despite the widespread belief that the work
belongs to the professor who creates it, 6 the law is far from clear in this
area. Copyright law’s “work-for-hire” doctrine states that works made
during the scope of the creator’s employment belong to his or her
employer. 7 Case law is notoriously unclear on whether works created by a
professor fall into a “teacher exception” to that doctrine. 8
[3]
Ownership of faculty-created works remains unclear largely due to
a dearth of litigation in the area. Published court opinions on the subject

3

17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006).

4

See id. § 203.

5

See id. § 301.

6

See infra p. 6.

7

See 17 U.S.C. § 101.

8

See infra Parts I-III.

2

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVIII, Issue1

are few and far between for two reasons. 9 First, universities tend to be
averse to litigation, especially against their own faculty members. 10 They
are loath to disturb institutional traditions and spark uprisings on their
campuses and in their communities. Second, most, if not all, educational
institutions preempt potential disputes over copyright ownership through
their faculty policies and employment contracts. 11 A modern university’s
standard practice often includes a copyright section in its intellectual
property policy that addresses the division of ownership for works created
by its professors. 12
[4]
What does the impending Superman litigation have to do with a
largely academic debate over the ownership rights of universities and their
employees? Notably, the Copyright Act does not extend termination
rights to works made for hire. 13 Thus, the Superman action will likely
encourage a burst in litigation over the boundaries of the work-for-hire
doctrine. 14 In fact, lawsuits seeking declaratory judgments concerning

9

See infra Parts I-III and accompanying notes. The cases cited in this article represent an
exhaustive list of all known published court opinions on the academic work-for-hire
issue.
10

See WENDY S. WHITE, WHAT TO DO WHEN YOU GET A SUBPOENA OR A LEGAL NOTICE
OR COMPLAINT? 7 (2010).
11

See Jed Scully, The Virtual Professorship: Intellectual Property Ownership of
Academic Work in a Digital Era, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 227, 257 (2004).
12

See Ashley Packard, Copyright or Copy Wrong: An Analysis of University Claims to
Faculty Work, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 275, 294-99 (2002) (citing Laura G. Lape,
Ownership of Copyrightable Works of University Professors: The Interplay Between the
Copyright Act and University Copyright Policies, 37 VILL. L. REV. 223 (1992)).
13

See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2006).

14

See Eric C. Osterberg, Copyright Termination – Watch out for Work for Hire, IP
LEGAL WATCH (Feb. 8, 2010, 11:57 AM), http://iplawwatch.foxrothschild.
com/2010/02/articles/copyrights/copyright-termination-watch-out-for-work-for-hire/;
Larry Rohter, A Village Person Tests the Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2011),
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artists’ termination rights are already impacting the doctrine. 15 This
litigation is drawing the attention of the software industry and concerning
some companies that their long-time engineers will attempt to assert
control over company programming codes. 16 In addition, the litigation
will likely have a major impact on whether teachers will own the
copyrights to the works they create.
[5]
The faculty work-for-hire issue will most likely encourage a
significant but more gradual increase in litigation in coming years for
reasons unrelated to termination rights. In the past, universities have
refrained from disputing the ownership of faculty-created works in part
because they rarely expected those works – mostly scholarly articles and
books – to become commercially marketable. 17
However, many
universities facing budget shortfalls are turning to their technology
transfer divisions in order to transform intellectual property into a

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/17/arts/music/village-people-singer-claims-rights-toymca.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the legal battle between Victor Willis and several
record companies over Willis’ termination rights to songs he helped create while a
member of the Village People); Larry Rohter, Record Industry Braces for Artists Battles
over Song Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com
/2011/08/16/arts/music/springsteen-and-others-soon-eligible-to-recover-song-rights.html
(describing imminent lawsuits involving musicians’ termination rights and the work-forhire doctrine).
15

See, e.g., Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, No. 10 Civ. 141(CM)(KNF), 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 82868 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2011) (holding that comic book characters such as
“The Fantastic Four” and “The X-Men” were works made for hire by Marvel Comics).
16

Cf. Justin Hughes, Market Regulation and Innovation: Size Matters (or Should) in
Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 579-580 (2005) (“In the software industry, it is
widely accepted that programmers reuse sections of code from prior programs.”).
17

See Scully, supra note 11, at 239.
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significant source of revenue. 18 While most universities have focused
their efforts on patents, some technology transfer offices look to
copyrights as well. 19 In the words of one commentator, “[t]he ownership
of academic work, non-patentable work, is now on the table as a
negotiation item between faculties and their employing universities.” 20
[6]
Moreover, professors are creating more copyrightable works of
substantial commercial value. 21 Science and engineering departments
have created much of the computer software powering the Internet
economy. 22 Digital media, such as online content and databases, may
carry huge commercial value. 23 Universities and colleges take particular

18

See Alexander Poltorak, Thar’s Gold in Them Thar Patents: Why It Pays to Protect
Patent Portfolios, UNIV. BUS. (Oct. 2009), http://www.universitybusiness.com
/viewarticle.aspx?articleid=1408&p=2.
19

See Arti K. Rai et al., University Software Ownership and Litigation: A First
Examination, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1525 (2009) (“[I]n contrast with biotechnology,
where copyright is not available, universities can use software copyright to achieve
revenue generation goals.”); Scully, supra note 11, at 229, 231, 259.
20

Scully, supra note 11, at 260.

21

See id. at 239 (explaining how this was not the case “before the arrival of digital
distribution by the Internet ten years ago”).
22

See id. at 257 (chronicling the development of the “information economy,” in which
“[w]ealth could now be more easily created from the acquisition, manipulation, and
dissemination of information through computers and the Internet than from the
manufacture and distribution of tangible goods like razors and race cars”).
23

See Gregor Pryor, Sachin Premnath & Joseph Rosenbaum, Commercial Risks and
Rewards of the Social Media Phenomenon, INT’L L. OFFICE (Feb. 18, 2010),
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=28190a25-de10-463594a1-2b54f99b06fb.
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interest in digital course materials such as online lectures. 24 Modern
distance education, a rapidly growing industry, depends on such materials
and attracts both educational non-profit and for-profit entities. 25 Many
universities have turned to online education to increase their tuition costs
and revenue relatively cheaply. 26 Meanwhile, other institutions have
begun to distribute digital course materials online at little or no cost. 27
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for example, now publishes
all of its course lectures online for free to the general public. 28 Apple
Computer, Inc. has created iTunes U, a free online service that allows
users to consume educational content on their handheld audio and video
devices. 29 These free services likely will cause friction in the distance
education industry.

24

See Glenda Morgan, Faculty Ownership and Control of Digital Course Materials, 5
TEACHING WITH TECH. TODAY, no. 4 (Univ. of Wis./ Office of Learning and Info. Tech.,
Madison, Wis.), Jan. 25, 2000, available at http://www.wisconsin.edu/ttt/facown.htm.
25

See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL DISTANCE
EDUCATION 20-23 (1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON COPYRIGHT]; Michael W. Klein, “The
Equitable Rule”: Copyright Ownership of Distance-Education Courses, 31 J.C. & U.L.
143, 146-47 (2004).
26

See REPORT ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 25, at 22-24 (“One major benefit of [distance
education] is that educational institutions have the costs of expensive distance education
technologies defrayed by their corporate partners . . . and often gain access to the latest
research of leading academics as reflected in their curriculum.”); Klein, supra note 25, at
148-49 (providing examples of several universities who are offering distance education
courses in conjunction with for-profit ventures); Scully, supra note 11, at 231.
27

See Klein, supra note 25, at 149; John Markoff, Virtual and Artificial, but 58,000 Want
Course, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/
science/16stanford.html?pagewanted=print.
28

See Klein, supra note 25, at 149.

29

See Jeffrey Selingo, Is iTunes U for You?, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2007, at W22.

6
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[7]
In fact, disputes over digital course materials have already arisen
on traditional college campuses. In 1998, Concord Law School, an onlineonly institution, contracted prominent Harvard Law School professor
Arthur Miller to produce a lecture series on Civil Procedure. 30 Harvard
objected, based on university policy that prohibited faculty from teaching
at other educational institutions without permission from the
administration. 31 The parties resolved the dispute out of court, but the
action demonstrated the rising stakes surrounding distance education. 32
Regarding the dispute, Alan Dershowitz, another Harvard Law School
professor, said, “[w]hat distinguishes the Internet from [other forms of
distance learning] is the number of zeroes.
The money is so
overwhelming that it can skew people’s judgment.” 33
[8]
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the faculty work-for-hire
issue is the near-universal assumption by the relevant parties – professors,
university administrators, and publishers – that professors own the works
they create. 34 For example, during the Harvard-Miller dispute, Harvard
professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr. said, “I’ve been teaching the same course

30

Amy Dockser Marcus, Seeing Crimson: Why Harvard Law Wants to Rein in One of Its
Star Professors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1999, at A1.
31

Id.

32

See id. (illustrating how Arthur Miller’s punishment will amount to no more than
sanctions issued by the university); see also Klein, supra note 25, at 192 (discussing the
friction caused by the University’s policy requiring permission from the dean prior to
serving as a teacher or consultant at an Internet-based institution).
33

Marcus, supra note 30.

34

Cf. Pub. Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 605 (D.D.C. 1959), rev'd
on other grounds, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated, 369 U.S. 111 (1962) (“Many
scientific articles published in technical journals are written by scientists employed by
private concerns and their employers generally encourage such activities. No one would
contend that the copyright on such articles would belong to the employer.”).
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. . . for 23 years. I’ve taught at Yale, Cornell and Duke, too, and when I
moved to a new university nobody said to me I couldn’t take my course
with me because the university owned it.” 35 In fact, the case law is far
from clear on the subject, and in the past twenty years, many
commentators have declared the “teacher exception” to the work-for-hire
doctrine to be dead. 36
[9]
This article aims to advance discussion about faculty work-for-hire
in light of a new set of decisions by the courts on the issue over the past
decade. Part II chronicles the rise of the teacher exception in the common
law and its subsequent fall with the Copyright Act of 1976, as well as the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision of Community for Creative Non-Violence
v. Reid 37 (“CCNV”). Part III analyzes how commentators have reacted
against the disappearance of the exception and the political and
sociological underpinnings of those reactions. Part IV describes how
some courts have revived, at least in part, the teacher exception in recent
years. Part V proposes a scope for the exception consistent with some of
these recent decisions and balances the binding force of the Copyright Act
and CCNV against the compelling policies under which courts originally
established the exception. The proposal introduces a two-part test: (1) a
work, to be considered authored by its academic creator, must be scholarly
in nature; and (2) the creator must have an occupation such that he or she
has a traditional expectation of ownership. Under this test, the teacher
exception would apply: to university faculty, but not to high school
teachers; to scholarly works, but not course or administrative materials;
and not only to teaching faculty, but to non-teaching faculty, graduate
students, and many other academics.

35

Marcus, supra note 30.

36

See infra pp. 13-14 and notes 85-86.

37

Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND NEAR ABANDONMENT
OF THE TEACHER EXCEPTION
[10] Historically, the trajectory of the teacher exception has not
followed a straight line. The exception emerged in the common law in
1929 and flourished throughout the middle portion of the Twentieth
Century. 38 However, the codification by the Copyright Act of 1976 of the
work-for-hire doctrine 39 jeopardized the fate of the teacher exception. The
1989 Supreme Court decision of Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid defined what the Copyright Act meant by the term “work made for
hire.” 40 Its definition seemed to represent the final nail in the coffin of the
teacher exception and faculty authorship of creative works.
A. The Rise of the Exception
[11] As a general rule, ownership of creative works belongs to those
who create them. 41 Typically, copyright law designates these people as
authors. 42 However, a work “made for hire” is considered authored by the
creator’s employer, not the creator. 43 Prior to 1976, the common law well

38

See generally Sherrill v. Grieves, 57 Wash. L. Rep. 286 (D.C. 1929) (establishing the
teacher exception).
39

See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or
other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of
this title, and unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument
signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”).
40

See generally Reid, 490 U.S. at 737-39, 742-43, 750-51.

41

See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).

42

See id. (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or
authors of the work.”).
43

Id. § 201(b).

9
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established this “work-for-hire” doctrine, both in state and federal
courts. 44 The rule acknowledges that employers often invest substantial
resources to support the creative work of their employees. 45 Often an
employer would not invest such resources, commission the work, or even
hire the creative employee if the employer did not receive ownership of
the work. 46
[12] In 1929, a District of Columbia court considered a case that
challenged the work-for-hire doctrine in the educational context. 47
Professor Sherrill, an Army officer and military instructor, had written a
textbook about military sketching and map reading. 48 Prior to publication,

44

See, e.g., Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342, 346 (1890) (“If one is employed to
devise or perfect an instrument, or a means for accomplishing a prescribed result, he
cannot, after successfully accomplishing the work for which he was employed, plead title
thereto as against his employer.”); Zahler v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 4 Cal. Rptr. 612,
617 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (“Where an employe[sic] creates something as part of his duties
under his employment, the thing created is the property of his employer . . . .”); Wallace
v. Helm, 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 121, 123 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1969) (“Plaintiff as
hirer of defendant M And S, is the owner of exclusive property rights . . . of the detailed
working drawings prepared by said defendant . . . during the course of his
employment.”); Phillips v. W.G.N., Inc., 307 Ill. App. 1, 10-11 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940) (“We
think the great weight of the evidence is that plaintiff was employed by defendants to do
particular work; was paid for it and in such a situation under the law the ownership in the
result of what was done belonged to defendants.”).
45

See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that such
“creative work” increases the status of the institution and lures “lucrative research, grants,
students and faculty”).
46

See Sandip H. Patel, Graduate Students’ Ownership and Attribution Rights in
Intellectual Property, 71 IND. L.J. 481, 496 (1996) (“In addition to their teaching and
administrative duties, most professors are hired to conduct research within a specified
discipline that draws on the inputs of other professors, students, and other university
resources.”).
47

See Sherrill v. Grieves, 57 Wash. L. Rep 286 (D.C. 1929).

48

Id. at 286.
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he printed a pamphlet incorporating a segment of his book. 49 The
defendant, another writer, copied sections of the pamphlet. 50 When
Professor Sherrill sued for copyright infringement, the defendant argued
that Professor Sherrill did not own the pamphlet’s contents. 51
[13] Based on pure policy grounds, with no precedent to support it, the
Sherrill court held that a professor, not his employer, owns the lectures he
writes. 52 The court focused in part on the difficulty it saw in
distinguishing spoken lectures from written ones, saying that there was no
“authority holding that such a professor is obliged to reduce his lectures to
writing or if he does so that they become the property of the institution
employing him.” 53
The court focused equally on pragmatic
considerations, observing that “officers do write such books which are
copyrighted and used in Government schools with the approval of the
military establishment and such books are found in the libraries of those
establishments.” 54 In essence, the Sherrill court reasoned that institutional
tradition and regular practice supported the professor’s ownership of his
lectures. 55

49

Id. at 290.

50

Id. at 286, 289-90.

51

See id. at 290 (“The defendants, while claiming that no use was made by [defendant] of
any part of the Leavenworth Pamphlet, contend . . . [the] pamphlet is a ‘publication of the
United States Government.’”).
52

See Sherrill, 57 Wash. L. Rep. at 290.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Cf. id. The logical corollary is that holding otherwise would have had widespread and
severe downstream effects on third parties such as military libraries and their readers.

11
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[14] It took forty years for another published opinion on faculty workfor-hire to arise. 56 In Williams v. Weisser, the California Court of Appeals
encountered a college note-taking company that hired students at the
University of California Los Angeles to attend classes and take lecture
notes, which the company then published. 57
The plaintiff, an
anthropology professor, sued the company for copyright infringement. 58
As in Sherrill, the defendant argued the professor did not own his
lectures. 59 Citing Sherrill, the court held that a professor owns the
common law copyright to his own lectures. 60
[15] The Williams court drew from some of the same policies as
Sherrill, reasoning that a university should not “prescribe [a professor’s]
way of expressing the ideas he puts before his students.” 61 More notably,
however, the court invoked the concepts of academic freedom and
movement, stating, “[p]rofessors are a peripatetic lot, moving from
campus to campus. The courses they teach begin to take shape at one
institution and are developed and embellished at another.” 62 The court
explicitly established what subsequently became known as the teacher

56

See Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).

57

See id. at 543.

58

See id.

59

See id. (“On appeal defendant [argued] . . . [t]he common law copyright in plaintiff’s
lectures presumptively belonged to UCLA.”).
60

See id. at 549 (“There is therefore no real difference between Sherrill and plaintiff.
Neither was under a duty to make notes, neither was under a duty to prepare for his
lectures during any fixed hours, but the notes that each made did directly relate to the
subjects taught.”).
61

Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 546.

62

Id.

12
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exception: “University lectures are sui generis. Absent compulsion by
statute or precedent, they should not be blindly thrown into the same legal
hopper with valve designs” or other creative works that had previously
been held to fall under the work-for-hire doctrine. 63
[16] In light of the sparse case law in the area of faculty work-for-hire,
the California Court of Appeals’ decision became the established common
law for all intents and purposes. 64 No court prior to the passage of the
Copyright Act of 1976 ever extended the work-for-hire doctrine to
professors or other academics. 65 In the 1970s, commentators, most
notably Professor Melville Nimmer, came to use the term “teacher
exception” to describe the rule established by Sherrill and Williams,
arguably implying that it would extend to all types of works by all
teachers, including K-12 educators. 66 Few considered that the policy
bases on which Sherrill and Williams rested might not apply to some types
of works, or apply in the K-12 classroom. 67

63

Id. at 547 (providing a list of various other works that were held as “works-for-hire” by
courts across the country).
64

See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
5.03[B][1][b][i] & n.94 (David Nimmer ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 2011), available at
LexisNexis Nimmer (tracing the history of court rulings on the teacher exception leading
up to the 1976 Act).
65

See id.; see also Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987) (“This
has been the academic tradition since copyright law began . . . .”).
66

See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 64, § 5.03[B][1][b][i] (using “teacher exception”
for the first time in Nimmer’s 1978 edition); Pamela A. Kilby, The Discouragement of
Learning: Scholarship Made for Hire, 21 J.C. & U.L. 455, 458-59 (1995); Elizabeth
Townsend, Legal and Policy Responses to the Disappearing “Teacher Exception,” or
Copyright Ownership in the 21st Century University, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 209,
211 (2003).
67

But see Russ VerSteeg, Copyright and the Educational Process: The Right of Teacher
Inception, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 381, 396 (1990) (“Should the Williams conclusion be equally
applicable to the not so peripatetic high school and grade school teachers?”).

13
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B. The Copyright Act of 1976, CCNV, and the Apparent Collapse
of the Exception
[17] Ironically, Williams’ qualification of the teacher exception “absent
compulsion by statute or precedent” 68 foreshadowed the events of the next
twenty-five years. In 1976, Congress passed its landmark re-write of the
copyright rules, effectively harmonizing them around the country by
removing the last vestiges of common law. 69 One of the 1976 Act’s many
changes was to codify the work-for-hire doctrine. 70 The new law states in
part: “In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared is considered the author . . . and, unless the
parties have expressly agreed otherwise . . . owns all of the rights
comprised in the copyright.” 71 The Act defines a “work made for hire” as
one “prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment.” 72 The Act does not define the terms “employee” or “scope
of one’s employment.” 73 The legislative history also provides no clue as
to how Congress intended the provision to apply to teachers and other
academics. 74

68

Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 547.

69

See generally Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006) (originally enacted as of
Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2541).
70

Id. § 201(b).

71

Id.

72

Id. § 101.

73

See id. (leaving the terms “employment” and “scope of employment” out of the
definitions section).
74

See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5736-37 (discussing the laborious task of adequately defining

14
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[18] Because Williams had so clearly created a special exception for
teachers, or at least for professors, and because the Copyright Act codified
the work-for-hire doctrine without reference to any exception for teachers,
“the conclusion that the Act abolished the exception may seem
inescapable.” 75 Still, at least one avenue remained for faculty ownership:
academic works might fall outside of the scope of a professor’s
employment and might thereby escape the work-for-hire doctrine
altogether.
[19] The Supreme Court defined the term “employee” under the
Copyright Act in 1989 with the landmark case of Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid. 76 In that case, the creator was not a teacher, but an
artist. 77 A non-profit organization contracted with James Reid, a sculptor,
to produce a statue “dramatiz[ing] the plight of the homeless.” 78 After Mr.
Reid finished his work, communication faltered, and CCNV eventually
filed an infringement action for ownership of the statue. 79 The Supreme
Court decided Mr. Reid was not an employee of the non-profit
organization; therefore, CCNV was not entitled to the statue under the

“works made for hire” in the Act); see also Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412,
416 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Until 1976, the statutory term ‘work made for hire’ was not
defined”); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 859, 888-890 (1987) (arguing the 1976 Act’s “pre-legislative
dialogue” indicates the term “employee” was meant to apply only to a “statutory worker
in a long-term position”).
75

Hays, 847 F.2d at 416.

76

See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 732 (1989).

77

Id.

78

Id. at 733.

79

See id. at 735.
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work-for-hire doctrine. 80 More importantly for future cases, the Court
held that in determining whether a work is a work made for hire under the
Copyright Act, courts should apply the principles of the common law of
agency. 81 It reasoned that:
In the past, when Congress has used the term ‘employee’
without defining it, we have concluded that Congress
intended to describe the conventional master-servant
relationship as understood by common-law agency
doctrine. . . . Nothing in the text of the work for hire
provisions indicates that Congress used the words
‘employee’ and ‘employment’ to describe anything other
than [that relationship]. 82
[20] Since the Court held that Reid was not an employee of the
organization, 83 it did not examine the “scope of employment” issue. It
nevertheless recognized that “scope of employment” was a “widely used
term of art in agency law,” 84 and lower courts have universally interpreted
CCNV to require the superimposition of the common law of agency on
“scope of employment” analyses. 85 Section 228 of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency, representing the common law of the time regarding
whether some work is within the scope of employment, indicated courts
could consider whether “(a) [the work] is of the kind [the employee] is

80

See id. at 752-53.

81

See Reid, 490 U.S. at 739-40.

82

Id. (citations omitted).

83

See id. at 752.

84

Id. at 740.

85

See, e.g., Price v. Fox Entm’t Grp., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 446, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time
and space limits; [and] (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to
serve the master . . . .” 86 Lower courts have continued to apply this test,
despite the fact that since 1989 both the common law and the Restatement
have shifted significantly toward finding more activity to fall within the
scope of employment. 87 While neither CCNV nor its lower-court progeny
addressed the teacher exception, the message was clear: the courts
intended to settle the meanings of the Copyright Act’s references to
“employee” and “scope of employment” in its work-for-hire provision.
The rules established in those cases applied to traditional master-servant
relationships and to non-traditional, unsupervised contractual relationships
alike. It seemed that there was no exception for teachers or others on the
university campus.
III. REACTIONS TO THE APPARENT DEATH OF
THE TEACHER EXCEPTION
[21] Since the late 1980s, commentators have declared the teacher
exception to be effectively dead, relegated to the dustbin of jurisprudential
history by the Copyright Act and CCNV. 88 Courts and commentators alike
have lamented its disappearance, and some have called for its revival. 89
This section examines some of the reactions of those courts and
commentators and summarizes their main arguments. Part IV will

86

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).

87

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(2) (2006). The impact of this commonlaw shift on the work-for-hire doctrine is unclear, and has not been discussed by any
courts or commentators. It is beyond the scope of this article.
88

See, e.g., Klein, supra note 25, at 168-69; Packard, supra note 12, at 314; Townsend,
supra note 66, at 243, 245.

89

See, e.g., Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1988); Packard,
supra note 12, at 314; Townsend, supra note 66, at 282-83.
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demonstrate how later courts invoked these arguments to resuscitate the
teacher exception, at least partially. Part V will evaluate some of these
arguments in order to design a practicable test to design a reasonable
scope for the revived exception.
A. Weinstein and Hays: The Exception on Life Support
[22] The Seventh Circuit decided two landmark teacher work-for-hire
cases in the late 1980s, 90 shortly before CCNV. Those cases, Weinstein v.
University of Illinois and Hays v. Sony Corporation of America,
recognized the threat that the Copyright Act posed to the teacher
exception, yet both managed to avert direct confrontation, each in its own
way. 91 Remarkably, these cases represent two very different approaches
to the post-1976 (and post-CCNV) teacher exception dilemma.
[23] The first case, Weinstein, involved a “private war” 92 among
university faculty members at the University of Illinois over the order of
authorship on a scholarly article published by the American Journal of
Pharmaceutical Education. 93 Professor Weinstein sued the university and
the other faculty members, claiming that they had deprived him of his due
process rights. 94 The defendants responded in part by arguing that
Weinstein lacked a property interest in the article. 95 The university had a

90

See Hays, 847 F.2d at 417; Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir.
1987).
91

Hays, 847 F.2d 412; Weinstein, 811 F.2d 1091.

92

Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1092.

93

See id.

94

See id.

95

See id. at 1095.
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written policy incorporated into Weinstein’s employment contract that
defined “work for hire” for purposes of its employees; yet it was not clear
under that policy who actually owned the article, the professor or the
university. 96
[24] In an opinion penned by Judge Easterbrook and joined by Judge
Posner, the Seventh Circuit held that the policy granted ownership of the
article to Professor Weinstein. 97 In doing so, it first acknowledged that the
Copyright Act “is general enough to make every academic article a ‘work
for hire’ and therefore vest exclusive control in universities rather than
scholars.” 98 It then examined the university’s policy only cursorily, and
concluded that the policy “reads more naturally when applied to
administrative duties,” despite no reference to administrative duties in the
policy. 99 The court relied almost exclusively on its recognition of an
“academic tradition” that existed “since copyright law began.” 100 It noted
a concession by the university that “a professor of mathematics who
proves a new theorem in the course of his employment will own the
copyright to his article containing that proof,” 101 and claimed, “[w]e

96

See id. at 1094.

97

See Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094-95. The Weinstein court decided the ownership of the
article under the university’s faculty employment contract, but not the article’s
authorship. Id. Assuming that the professor assigned the article to the American Journal
of Pharmaceutical Education, the decision does not bear directly on who would be able to
assert termination rights to the article 35 years after its creation in 1985. See id. at 1092.
Thus, if the article was in fact a work made for hire, then ownership might revert to the
university in 2020 rather than to Professor Weinstein.
98

Id. at 1094.

99

Id.

100

Id. (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 64,§ 5.03[B][1][b]).

101

Id.
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would be surprised if any member of the faculty of the College of
Pharmacy treats his academic work as the property of the University.” 102
Thus, Weinstein represents two arguments central to the faculty work-forhire debate: first, that an “academic tradition” weighs heavily in favor of
recognizing the teacher exception; and second, that the teacher exception
did not work so much as a legal rule in the absence of contract, but as a
canon for interpreting employment contracts and university policies.
[25] Hays, the second of the Seventh Circuit’s cases on faculty workfor-hire, did not involve an employment contract including a copyright
provision upon which the court could fall back. 103 Remarkably, Judge
Posner wrote the Hays opinion and was joined by Judge Easterbrook. 104
Two high school teachers had prepared an instructional manual on how to
operate the school’s Sony word processors, and had distributed the manual
to students and colleagues. 105 Their employment contracts made no
mention of copyrightable works. 106 Two years later, the teachers
discovered that Sony had published a manual very similar to theirs, “in
many places a verbatim copy,” and sued for copyright infringement. 107
Sony defended in part by arguing that the teachers did not own the manual
they wrote. 108 The trial court dismissed the complaint, calling its claims

102

Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094.

103

See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The plaintiffs’
employment contracts with the school district contain no reference to copyright . . . .”).

104

Id. at 413.

105

See id.

106

Id. at 417.

107

Id. at 413.

108

See Hays, 847 F.2d. at 415.
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and requests for relief frivolous, and awarded Rule 11 sanctions to
Sony. 109
[26] The Seventh Circuit did not rule on dismissal itself, since the
plaintiffs had failed to perfect their appeal on that issue. 110 However,
Judge Posner, a university professor himself, seemed to go out of his way
to declare his support of the teacher exception. In doing so, he relied on
pure policy grounds, arguing that “the universal assumption and practice
[prior to 1976] was that . . . the right to copyright such writing belonged to
the teacher rather than to the college or university,” 111 and that “[t]he
reasons for a presumption against finding academic writings to be work
made for hire are as forceful today as they ever were.” 112 Judge Posner
went well beyond the reasoning of Weinstein, observing that “[a] college
or university does not supervise its faculty in the preparation of academic
books and articles, and is poorly equipped to exploit their writings . . .
.” 113 He continued:
To a literalist of statutory interpretation, the conclusion that
the Act abolished the exception may seem inescapable. . . .
But considering the havoc that such a conclusion would
wreak in the settled practices of academic institutions, the
lack of fit between the policy of the work-for-hire doctrine
and the conditions of academic production, and the absence
of any indication that Congress meant to abolish the teacher
exception, we might, if forced to decide the issue, conclude

109

See id. at 413.

110

See id. at 417.

111

Id. at 416.

112

Id.

113

Hays, 847 F.2d at 416.
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that the exception had survived the enactment of the 1976
Act. 114
[27] Hays stands for three principles in support of the teacher
exception. First, as noted in Weinstein, there is a widespread assumption
among professors and universities alike, based on academic tradition, that
professors own the scholarly works they create. 115 Second, disturbance of
that academic tradition would “wreak havoc” on settled practices. 116
Finally, the absence of a teacher exception would be incongruent with “the
conditions of academic production,” which foster scholarship in the
university context. 117 In effect, Judge Posner defended what he saw as an
attack on the principle of academic freedom.
[28] Perhaps most remarkably, Hays concerns high school teachers, 118
not university professors, so these principles had little relevance to the
facts of the case. Judge Posner seemed to acknowledge this by reasoning
that, even if the teacher exception no longer existed, the word processor
manual may have escaped the work-for-hire doctrine because, “[u]nlike
college and university teachers, high-school teachers normally are not
expected to do writing as part of their employment duties.” 119 However,
the court did not address the possibility that the teacher exception did not,
or should not, extend from the college campus to the high school
classroom.

114

Id. at 416-17.

115

See id. at 416.

116

See id.

117

See id.

118

119

Hays, 847 F.2d at 413.
Id. at 417.
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B. Commentators’ Reactions
[29] In Hays, Judge Posner noted, “it is widely believed that the 1976
Act abolished the teacher exception.” 120 Indeed, observers during the
1978-1989 period declared the exception either dead or knocking on
death’s door. 121 If the Copyright Act provided the teacher exception’s
coffin, then CCNV provided the nails. By holding that the common law of
agency should manage the contours of the work-for-hire doctrine,
regardless of whether a traditional employee or an artist (or, presumably, a
professor or a high school teacher) created the copyrighted work, the
Supreme Court seemed to leave little room for an exception based on a
seldom-cited common-law copyright theory.
Since 1989, some
commentators have declared the teacher exception gone for good. 122
Others have argued it survives, not as a formal exception to the work-forhire doctrine, but as a Weinstein-like canon for the interpretation of
employment contracts or agency law. 123 Still others have argued that the
exception lives on in true form, yet with little support from the courts

120

Id. at 416.

121

See, e.g., Leonard D. Duboff, An Academic’s Copyright: Publish and Perish, 32 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 17, 24-25 (1984) (“This 1976 Copyright Act fails to support
this traditional relationship between the academician and the institution in which he
works.”); Todd F. Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They “Works Made for Hire” Under the
1976 Copyright Act?, 9 J.C. & U.L. 485, 486 (1982) (“[S]tate common law copyright is
pre-empted by federal copyright for most purposes [under § 301], undermining the
precedential value of the handful of common law cases on point which might be utilized
to excuse faculty from the work ‘made for hire’ provision of the 1976 Act.”).
122

See, e.g., Klein, supra note 25, at 144; Packard, supra note 12, at 314.

123

See, e.g., Kilby, supra note 66, at 459; James B. Wadley & JoLynn M. Brown,
Working Between the Lines of Reid: Teachers, Copyrights, Work-for-Hire and a New
Washburn University Policy, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 385, 427-28 (1999).

23

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVIII, Issue1

beyond Hays’ dicta to support them. 124 As explained in Part III, however,
the teacher exception has survived, and multiple court opinions have cited
the exception approvingly.
IV. THE TEACHER EXCEPTION’S SURVIVAL INTO THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
[30] After a period of near-silence by the courts on academic work-forhire problems during the 1990s, the teacher exception has apparently
lurched back from death in the 21st Century. No court has ever explicitly
rejected it. Moreover, recent published federal decisions have accepted its
continuing existence. 125 One such court, Bosch v. Ball-Kell, cites the
exception explicitly to award authorship of copyrighted works to a
university professor. 126 Considering the historical dearth of published
court opinions on academic work-for-hire issues, one could say that the
teacher exception is alive and kicking. This Part examines the case law
that has revived the exception, and looks at courts’ attempts to delineate
its scope.

124

See, e.g., Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Conflicts on the University Campus: The First
Annual Christopher A. Meyer Memorial Lecture, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 291,
304 (2000); Townsend, supra note 66, at 245-46.
125

See, e.g., Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 186 (2d
Cir. 2004); Bosch v. Ball-Kell, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713, 1719-20 (C.D. Ill. 2006).
126

See Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716-1722. The decision in Bosch only denied
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of whether Bosch owned the
teaching materials in question. See id. at 1721. However, in the subsequent jury trial, the
jury determined Bosch to be the owner of two of three sets of teaching materials. Bosch
v. Ball-Kell, No. 03-1408, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63785, at *1-2 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 29,
2007). The defendant’s Rule 50 Motion to Direct Entry of Judgment as a Matter of Law
was subsequently denied. Id. at *1, *3.
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A. Recognition of the Exception by Some Courts
[31] The Second Circuit was the first court to recognize the continuing
viability of the teacher exception, albeit implicitly. 127 In Shaul v. Cherry
Valley-Springfield Central School District, decided in 2004, a public
school district suspended William Shaul, a high school mathematics
teacher, in connection with allegations that he had harassed and engaged
in improper relations with several female students. 128 Following his
suspension, school officials took teaching materials from his office, at one
point drilling out the lock of one of his filing cabinets. 129 The materials
included “tests, quizzes, and homework problems.” 130 No school policy
addressed the ownership of such works. 131 Shaul then sued the school
district under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that he had a property interest in
the materials and that their seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. 132
[32] Adhering to CCNV and common-law agency principles, the
Second Circuit held that the high school owned the teaching materials that
Shaul had created. 133 However, the court made the following response to
Shaul’s argument that he owned the materials under the teacher exception:
The plaintiff . . . seeks to invoke an “academic” exception
to the work-for-hire doctrine. See Weinstein v. University
127

See generally Shaul, 363 F.3d 177.

128

See id. at 180.

129

See id. at 181.

130

Id.

131

See id. at 186.

132

See Shaul, 363 F.3d at 181.

133

See id. at 185-86.
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of Illinois, 811 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1987). However, unlike
the university employer in Weinstein, the School District in
the instant case does not have a formal and written policy
concerning work produced by teachers. Furthermore, the
“academic tradition” granting authors ownership of their
own scholarly work is not pertinent to teaching materials
that were never explicitly prepared for publication by
Shaul, as opposed to published articles by university
professors. 134
Thus, while the court did not endorse the teacher exception, neither did the
court reject it in its entirety. Most interestingly, by distinguishing teaching
materials created by high school teachers from published articles created
by university professors, 135 it implicitly proposed a narrowing of the
exception’s scope, if it existed at all. It rested its distinction on the
contours of academic tradition, the principle on which Weinstein and Hays
were based. 136
[33] A year later, in Pavlica v. Behr, the Southern District of New York
encountered another dispute in which a high school teacher claimed
ownership of a work he created. 137 In that case, Robert Pavlica, a science
teacher, wrote a manual explaining a method of teaching independent
134

Id. at 186 (citation omitted).

135

See id.

136

See id. (“However, unlike the university employer in Weinstein, the School District in
the instant case does not have a formal and written policy concerning work produced by
teachers.”) Ironically, however, by declining to extend the exception to the high school
context or to unpublished teaching materials, the Second Circuit contradicted two of the
most often-cited teacher exception precedents, Hays (high school teachers) and Weisser
(unpublished teaching materials). See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir.
1988); Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987).
137

See Pavlica v. Behr, 397 F. Supp. 2d 519 (2005).
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science research to high school students. 138 He created the manual at his
home, on his own time and without any involvement or direction by the
school. 139 He then worked with two colleagues, under a grant from the
National Science Foundation (“NSF”), to distribute the manual in a series
of workshops outside of school. 140 He later sued those colleagues,
alleging that they had copied and distributed the manual without his
permission. 141 As in many other work-for-hire disputes, the defendants
moved for summary judgment on the basis that Pavlica did not own the
copyright to the manual. 142
[34] The court denied the defendants’ motion finding sufficient
evidence to show that Pavlica, and not his school, owned the copyright to
the manual that he wrote. 143 While it did not rest its conclusion on the
teacher exception, similar to Hays, Pavlica “‘prepared the manual on [his]
own initiative without direction or supervision by [his] superiors.’” 144 The
court distinguished the situation from Shaul, concluding that a reasonable
jury could find that “Pavlica designed an entirely new course without
assistance of or direction by his employer.” 145
138

See id. at 522.

139

Id.

140

See id. at 523.

141

See id. at 523-24.

142

See Pavlica, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 524.

143

See id. at 525-26. Finding that defendants’ motion for summary judgment should not
be granted because a genuine issue of material fact existed on the question of ownership,
the court noted that “[i]ndeed, even Byram Hills maintains that Pavlica owns the
copyright to the manual and pays him the standard fee for use of the manual in its science
research program.” Id. at 525.
144

Id. at 526 (quoting Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1988)).

145

Id. at 525.
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[35] The Pavlica opinion is significant to the teacher exception
equation because it demonstrates that, even were courts do limit the
teacher exception to the university setting, as Shaul did, K-12 teachers
would retain ownership of many of the works they create. To do so they
would simply have to prove that they created those works outside of the
scope of their employment. Because K-12 teachers’ duties to their schools
are usually clearer than professors’ duties to their universities, it is easier
for them to demonstrate they had no duty to create the work in question.
Therefore, the court easily found the drafting of the manual fell outside of
the scope of Pavlica’s employment. However, if a university professor
had accepted the same NSF grant to write and distribute the very same
manual, then the scope-of-employment analysis may have proven more
difficult, and the court very well might have gone the opposite way.
[36] While Shaul and Pavlica cracked the door for the teacher
exception, Bosch v. Ball-Kell slammed it wide open. 146 Bosch, decided by
Judge Mihm of the Central District of Illinois in 2006, involved a dispute
in the pathology department at the University of Illinois College of
Medicine in Peoria (“UICOM”). 147 The plaintiff, professor and course
director Barbara Bosch, resigned from her position following a
particularly vicious feud with two other members of the faculty, Susan
Ball-Kell and Donald Rager. 148 Five days after Bosch’s resignation as
course director, Ball-Kell entered Bosch’s office and took copies of her
course materials, including lectures, exam questions, and laboratory
protocols. 149 When Ball-Kell copied and used those materials to teach her

146

See generally Bosch v. Ball-Kell, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713 (C.D. Ill. 2006).

147

Id. at 1715.

148

See id. at 1715–16.

149

Id.
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own classes, Bosch sued for copyright infringement. 150 The defendants
argued that the materials were “works made for hire” owned by
UICOM. 151
[37] The court held that it was Professor Bosch, rather than UICOM,
who owned the course materials. 152 It explicitly rested its conclusion
largely on the “logic” of the Weinstein and Hays pronouncements in
support of the teacher exception. 153 It elaborated on what Hays called “the
lack of fit between the policy of the work-for-hire doctrine and the
conditions of academic production . . . .” 154 The court continued:
In the typical work for hire scenario, the employer assigns
and directs the topic, content, and purpose of the work. In
the academic setting, an employee may be assigned to teach
a particular course, but then is generally left to use his or
her discretion to determine the focus of the topic, the way
the topic is going to be approached, the direction of the
inquiry, and the way the material will ultimately be
presented. 155
[38] Interestingly, the defendants argued not that Weinstein and Hays
were unpersuasive, or that the Supreme Court’s subsequent CCNV
150

See id. at 1716–17.

151

Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006)).

152

See id.

153

See id. at 1719-21; see also supra note 126 (providing background information on the
subsequent jury trial in this case).
154

Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719-20 (quoting Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847
F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988)).
155

Id. at 1720.
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decision overruled them, but that they applied solely to “faculty
publications for scholarly review or self-promotion,” and not to course
materials. 156 However, the court countered by pointing to the university’s
intellectual property policy. 157 Within the category of “traditional
academic copyrightable works,” the policy itself listed only “class notes
[and] educational software”; 158 yet, citing Weinstein, the court considered
evidence offered by Bosch of deliberations in the faculty senate regarding
UICOM’s intellectual property policy. 159 That evidence demonstrated a
“legislative intent, so to speak,” that the policy considered “course
materials, such as syllabi, notes, etc.” to be “traditional academic
copyrightable works,” owned by their faculty creators rather than by the
university. 160 The court also pointed to further deliberations by a faculty
senate committee that demonstrated “the general practice and
understanding, by both faculty and apparently also by University counsel,
that teaching materials fell within the [university policy's] general rule of
traditional academic works for which ownership would be vested in the
author of the materials.” 161
[39] What is perhaps most ironic about this line of reasoning is the
court had no explanation of why the deliberative history of the university’s
policy, as opposed to the policy’s text, should have had any bearing on the
court’s decision. Under the Copyright Act, the employer owns a work
made for hire “unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a

156

Id. at 1720.

157

See id.

158

Id.

159

See Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720.

160

Id.

161

Id. at 1721.
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written instrument signed by them.” 162 The Weinstein court examined the
text of the University of Illinois’s intellectual property policy because
Professor Weinstein’s employment contract incorporated it explicitly; 163
the Bosch court made no similar connection between Professor Bosch’s
contract and the UICOM policy. 164 Moreover, the court made no
indication that she was present during any of the committee meeting
deliberations cited by the court. 165 In fact, one of the deliberations the
court cited took place after Ball-Kell had taken the materials from Bosch’s
office. 166 In summary, it is unlikely that Bosch had any privity with
respect to the senate deliberations; therefore, they should have bound
neither her nor UICOM. 167
[40] Bosch is also notable because it highlights the potential for
universities and their administrators to copy or distribute works even when
those works fall under the teacher exception and are owned by their
faculty members. After the court found sufficient evidence that Professor
Bosch owned the copyright to her teaching materials to survive summary
judgment, it then proceeded to analyze whether the university could be
162

17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).

163

See Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987).

164

See Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720 (noting that Bosch sought confirmation of
the policy from the University Intellectual Property Office).

165

See id. at 1720. The court considered evidence presented by Bosch of a University
senate committee deliberation as shown in meeting minutes, and formal findings stated in
a committee report to the University president regarding her complaint. See id.

166

Id. at 1716, 1720 (illustrating how Ball-Kell took the teaching materials on August 7,
2002, and the faculty senate committee report was dated April 12, 2003).
167

See Wadley & Brown, supra note 123, at 423 (“It is unlikely that [many university IP]
policies can satisfy the requirements of the writing envisioned by section 201(b) because
they are typically not signed by the parties and do not expressly reverse the presumption
of the [work-for-hire] doctrine.”).
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shielded from liability by the fair use doctrine. 168 Therefore, the court
refused to grant the university’s motion for summary judgment on that
basis. 169 A jury later found that UICOM’s reproduction of two works
owned by Bosch was considered fair use and “did not infringe on Bosch’s
copyrights.” 170 Fair use may well protect universities and university
administrators in many other contexts in which they would otherwise be
infringing. It is important to note, however, that other defendants in
faculty work-for-hire disputes, such as between faculty author and
publishers arguing professors, do not have standing to assert termination
rights, and would not be able to use this defense.
B. Omission (but Not Rejection) of the Exception by Other Courts
[41] While the preceding cases show judicial recognition of faculty
ownership, either outright or via the teacher exception, other courts in
recent years granted ownership of faculty-created works to the employer
without any reference to the exception. 171
[42] University of Colorado Foundation v. American Cyanamid was a
faculty work-for-hire dispute between a private vitamin manufacturer and

168

See Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721-23.

169

Id. at 1723.

170

See Bosch v. Ball-Kell, No. 03-1408, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63785, *2-3 (C.D. Ill.
Aug. 29, 2007) (discussing the reasons why the jury found the University’s use of the
teaching materials constituted fair use); see also Jeff Galin, Bosch v. Ball-Kell: Faculty
May Have Lost Control over Their Teaching Materials, NAT’L COUNCIL OF TCHRS. OF
ENG. (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.ncte.org/cccc/committees/ip/2007developments/
boschvballkell.
171

See e.g., Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (D. Colo.
1998); Univ. of Colo. Found. v. Am. Cyanamid, 880 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Colo. 1995),
rev’d on other grounds, 902 F. Supp. 221 (D. Colo. 1995); Rouse v. Walter & Assocs.,
513 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Iowa 2007).
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a university. 172 The manufacturer paid university faculty members to
devise and study a reformulated prenatal vitamin. 173 The faculty
submitted the research results for publication in professional journals and
supplied the manufacturer with a courtesy copy of the submission. 174
Using the contents of that article and the university’s research, the
manufacturer procured a patent for the reformulated vitamin, prompting
the university to file suit. 175 The defense argued that actual ownership of
the research product and article was unclear, but offered no evidence to
support this position. 176 The court concluded that the university owned
the work, with no need to address in detail agency principles or the teacher
exception. 177
[43] Vanderhurst v. Colorado Mountain College District was an
employment termination dispute in which the plaintiff, a veterinary
professor and clinician, brought a copyright infringement claim against his

172

See Cyanamid, 880 F. Supp. at 1389.

173

See id. at 1390.

174

Id. at 1391 (noting the New England Journal of Medicine’s rejection to publish the
study in 1981, which was later accepted and published in the March 1983 volume of
“Obstetrics and Gynecology”).

175

See id. at 1392. Notably, this case did not involve an authorship dispute between the
university and its faculty, as patent ownership in faculty research was contractually
assigned to the university pursuant to its policies. See id. at 1391. The faculty members
did however join the university as plaintiffs in the litigation, which collectively alleged:
conversion, fraud, wrongful naming of patent inventor, copyright and patent
infringement, breach of confidentiality, and unjust enrichment. Id. at 1389.
176

See id. at 1400 (“Cyanamid offers no evidence which places in issue the original
authorship of the Article by [the faculty members], nor the [university’s] entitlement to
ownership of the copyright as their employer.”).

177

See Cyanamid, 880 F. Supp. at 1400-03 (assessing each element of the plaintiffs’
copyright infringement claim).
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former employer for allegedly infringing use of a “Veterinary Technology
Outline” that he developed “in the course of teaching . . . .” 178 The court
followed CCNV and agency principles and relied heavily upon the
employer’s stated policy, which defined a faculty member’s duties to
include “professional service activities [including], but not limited to,
course, program and curriculum development [and] course
preparations.’” 179 The court made no mention of the teacher exception
and granted summary judgment to the employer as “there [was] no
genuine dispute that Vanderhurst’s creation of the Outline was connected
directly with the work for which [he] was employed … and was fairly and
reasonably incidental to his employment.” 180
[44] In Rouse v. Walter & Associates, agricultural research professors at
Iowa State University (“ISU”) sued an external consultant for alleged
infringement of cattle-imaging software the faculty members had created
together. 181 The consultant argued that ISU owned the copyright to
software code used to develop new technology and the code was created
during the course of research as a work for hire, therefore, the plaintiffs
did not own the software. 182 Adhering closely to CCNV and its nonacademic progeny, the court overlooked any possible teacher exception in
its thorough analysis of agency principles, holding that ISU owned the
copyright to the software code. 183 In particular, the court emphasized the
178

See Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1298, 1307 (D.
Colo. 1998).

179

Id. at 1307 (internal quotation marks omitted).

180

Id.

181

See Rouse v. Walker & Assocs., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1045-50 (S.D. Iowa 2007).

182

See id. at 1053 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006)) (“Only ‘[t]he legal or beneficial
owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled … to institute an action for any
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.’”).
183

See id. at 1055-61.
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fact that the professors “were employed as faculty members of ISU” and
dedicated their careers to developing the type of technology at issue. 184
The court also brushed aside evidence that the professors did “the ‘vast’
majority of programming” 185 at home on a personal computer, instead
emphasizing the software was tested using university equipment. 186 The
court also made no mention of the teacher exception.
[45] These decisions, particularly Rouse, demonstrate the uphill battle
that university faculty members face in attempts to defend individual
ownership absent a teacher exception. Whether by contract, university
policy, or the seemingly inescapable precedent of CCNV, the scope of a
professor’s employment includes the production of scholarly articles and
teaching materials with unfortunate frequency. 187 In other words, the job
description of many a professor is to “publish or perish,” that is, to create
Under agency principles every work the
copyrightable works. 188
professor creates and publishes is automatically a work made for hire,
owned by the university. 189 What makes the university-professor
relationship different from the traditional master-servant relationship
envisioned by agency law is the fact that the university so rarely dictates
the content, the approach, or even the subject of potential works.

184

Id. at 1061.

185

Id. at 1058.

186

See Rouse, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 1059-60.

187

See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 1
(2010-11 ed.), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos066.htm (describing professors’
general duties “to do their own research” and to “publish their findings in scholarly
journals, books, and electronic media”).
188

Klein, supra note 25, at 166.

189

See Packard, supra note 12, at 289.
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Moreover, the professor expects to control his or her scholarly work as a
matter of academic freedom, a principle that implicates both intellectual
progress and freedom of expression. 190
V. A PROPOSED TWO-PRONGED TEST TO DELINEATE THE SCOPE OF
THE TEACHER EXCEPTION
[46] As litigation over the work-for-hire doctrine in academic settings
increases in the coming years, courts that accept the continuing viability of
the teacher exception will inevitably have to grapple with the exception’s
scope. While some courts may accept the exception wholeheartedly, as
the Bosch court did, 191 few would be so brazen as to suggest an across-theboard exemption for teachers from the work-for-hire doctrine, no matter
what type of works they create. Moreover, if courts award to teachers a
limited exemption from the general rule, then disputants will surely argue
over who is a “teacher” and who is not. Also, non-teachers will surely
argue they are just as entitled to an exemption.
[47] From a methodological standpoint, the dilemma faced by future
courts is a classic one, that of a tension between statutory text and binding
higher court precedent on the one hand, and countervailing policy
considerations on the other. In similar situations in other areas of law, the
way a lower court decides depends largely on its philosophy regarding
deference to prior legislative and judicial decision-making on the one
hand, and the subjective weight the court assigns to the countervailing
policies on the other. 192 In this case, many particularly strong policybased arguments in favor of recognizing the teacher exception exist, as
190

See id. at 289-93 (discussing the connection between academic freedom and freedom
of expression).
191

See Bosch v. Ball-Kell, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713, 1719-21 (C.D. Ill. 2006).

192

See, e.g., id. (looking to prior legislative and judicial decision-making evidence in
deciding whether the teacher exception applies).
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articulated by prior courts and commentators. What is more, the peculiar
history of the work-for-hire doctrine and the teacher exception clouds the
equation considerably. The teacher exception does not represent a
standard policy-based carve-out to a statutory rule since in this case the
“carve-out” was established in the law before the statute ever existed. 193
There is simply no evidence whether Congress or the Supreme Court
intended to override this particular aspect of the pre-existing common law.
[48] This Part proposes a balanced and judicially manageable scope for
the teacher exception. Before continuing further, however, it is necessary
to make two important notes. First, this proposal assumes that the teacher
exception does continue to exist in one form or another in the post-CCNV
work-for-hire doctrine. Bosch, and to a lesser extent Pavlica, prove that
courts continue to recognize the teacher exception. 194 This article aims to
aid future courts that accept this reality but struggle to determine the scope
of the exception. It is not intended to weigh in over whether courts should
recognize the teacher exception in the first place. This author believes he
has little new to offer in that well-worn debate.
[49] Second, the proposed scope of the teacher exception is meant as a
judicial solution, not as a legislative solution. It seeks to balance policy
considerations against deference to prior decisions made by Congress and
the Supreme Court; 195 Congress owes no such deference. It is based in
part on a desire to avoid wanton judicial policymaking and to respect the

193

See supra Part I.

194

See Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720; Pavlica v. Behr, 397 F. Supp. 2d 519, 52425 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Contra Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363
F.3d 177, 185-86 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the work-for-hire doctrine precluded the
teacher’s ownership in tests and quizzes).

195

See, e.g., Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718-21 (looking to both policy
considerations and prior case law to make a determination on the applicability of the
teacher exception).
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constitutional division between the judicial and legislative branches of
government. Thus, ideal judicial and legislative solutions to the faculty
work-for-hire problem do and should diverge. However, this author
believes that a legislative solution to the problem is unlikely to come about
in the foreseeable future without either a judicial decision that has a nearcataclysmic impact on professors or universities, or a complete overhaul
of this country’s copyright regime. In all likelihood, none of the lobbying
groups representing the interests of professors, universities, K-12 teachers,
or school administrators have both the political clout on Capitol Hill and
the desire to disturb the peace between universities and their faculties in
order to push through any legislation to deal with the issue.
A. Prong One: the Type of the Work
[50] Academic copyrightable works fall into three broad categories: (1)
scholarly works; (2) course materials; and (3) administrative works. 196
Scholarly works are those works that the academic creates without direct
supervision from his or her employer, during unscheduled time, for a
primary purpose other than the teaching of specific courses offered to
students by the university. 197 Publication of a copyrightable work
provides evidence that the work is scholarly in purpose, but is neither
necessary nor sufficient to prove scholarly character. Thus, research
articles and opinion pieces are generally scholarly works, whether
published or unpublished. Course materials are works created primarily
for the purpose of teaching specific courses offered to students by the

196

This article presents this categorization scheme purely as a heuristic tool in support of
the analysis that follows. It makes no claim that such a scheme is the only or the best
way to categorize academic copyrightable works for other purposes.

197

Cf. Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717 (defining “traditional academic
copyrightable works” as all materials “created independently and at the creator’s
initiative . . . not created as an institutional initiative”).
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employer, such as most lectures, teaching notes and exams. 198
Administrative works comprise the catch-all category of all works that are
neither scholarly works nor course materials: they include all of the
academic’s works created under direct supervision or during employerscheduled time, but exclude all works created for the primary purpose of
teaching specific courses offered by the university. 199 Most works falling
into this category would deal with university or departmental business.
[51] Borderline cases under this system of categorization are important,
but usually cases fall fairly neatly into one category or another. Textbooks
prepared for publication usually classify as scholarly works, since while
their creators often test them in their own courses, their primary use is at
other educational institutions. Prepared lectures for a hypothetical course
that a professor’s university does not offer to its students would also
classify as scholarly works, while lectures prepared by one professor for a
course taught by a colleague at the same university would classify as
teaching materials. Works related to teaching in general, but not to any
specific course, such as materials for the development of curricula or
grading schemes, would classify as administrative works. Notably, from
the perspective of copyright law, software code would not fit into one
category or another as a whole. The character of a piece of software
would depend on the circumstances and purposes of its creation, just as
with any other type of copyrightable work.

198

See, e.g., Shaul, 363 F.3d at 186 (holding that tests, quizzes and homework problems
created by the teacher were owned by the school – and not the teacher – under the workfor-hire doctrine because the materials were for an already established class, and thus
under his scope of employment as a teacher).
199

See, e.g., Weinstein v. University of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987)
(“Perhaps the University forms a committee to study the appropriate use of small
computers and conscripts professors as members. The committee may publish a report, in
which the University will claim copyright.”). Accordingly, because these works are
“prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment,” they fall under the
work-for-hire exception. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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[52] The teacher exception should apply to scholarly works, but not to
course materials or administrative works. The reason for this is
straightforward: the truly compelling justifications for the teacher
exception apply most strongly to scholarly works, and less strongly to
other categories. Judge Posner articulated the reasoning most succinctly: a
declaration of ownership of scholarly works in universities, rather than in
professors, would be fundamentally at odds with the "conditions of
academic production" and would "wreak [havoc] in the settled practices of
academic institutions. . . ." 200 Intellectual workers in the academic world
often need the creative freedom and control associated with ownership in
order to do their work. Lack of freedom and control not only would
potentially stifle professors’ creativity, but would discourage them from
joining the academy in the first place. The campus culture, the cradle of
modern innovation in the sciences and the arts, would be fundamentally
threatened. Moreover, professors' assignments of their copyrights to third
parties would in many cases be invalidated, causing massive disruptions in
the industries that depend heavily on those assignments, such as
publishing and computer software. For example, if copyright assignees in
those industries made their agreements with the professors rather than with
their universities, a declaration of university authorship might seriously
jeopardize the rights of a publisher that made a book deal with an
Economics professor, or of a dot-com that purchased software code from a
Computer Science professor. The downstream economic effects of such a
widespread loss of the perceived property and contractual rights could be
catastrophic.
[53] In contrast, university control over course materials and
administrative works would not have nearly such widespread or negative
effects. Professors prepare lectures, syllabi, and exam materials for
purposes internal to their universities, not external. The property and
contractual rights affected by the ownership of the works are those of the
professor and the university, and rarely have significant downstream
200

Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988).
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effects. 201 Moreover, the justifications for the work-for-hire doctrine
apply in stronger force to course materials and administrative works than
to scholarly works. While universities have a legitimate business interest
in enhancing their reputations through the scholarly work of their
faculties, 202 they have an even stronger interest, buttressed by both
reputation and contractual duty, in maintaining their business operations,
controlling their curricula, and ensuring that each student receives a
quality education.
[54] The Williams court supported its application of the teacher
exception to lecture notes by arguing, in part, that “[p]rofessors are a
peripatetic lot, moving from campus to campus,” and that they need to
keep ownership of their course materials in order to develop them for
future courses at other institutions. 203 Even if tenured professors do move
around more than the typical non-academic creative employee – a bold
assumption in today’s mobile job marketplace – the need of professors to
keep control of their course materials does not seem so compelling as to
justify a departure from statutory work-for-hire doctrine. Universities
have as much of a right to control the evolution of teaching materials as
professors, if not more so. The value of a professorial candidate to a
university lies in her credentials, reputation, teaching ability, and ability to
attract research funding; it should not be the intellectual property that she
carries with her.
[55] If course materials belong to universities, rather than to professors,
then what recourse do the professors have to develop their lectures freely

201

Under the Copyright Act, works within the academic setting are either owned by the
professor, or by the university. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) § 201(b).

202

See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that
university funding and sanctioning of research projects serves “to increase the status of
the institution and lure lucrative research grants, students and faculty”).

203

Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542, 546 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
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and independently from university control? In fact, professors have
several tools at their disposal to retain use rights to their teaching
materials. Under the categories of academic works described earlier,
textbooks, lectures, and other teaching materials not created primarily for
specific university courses would be considered scholarly in nature and
would therefore fall under the teacher exception. 204 Courts might also
hold, similarly to Bosch, that professors may use course materials they
create on behalf of their universities under the fair use doctrine. 205
Additionally, professors may gain the right to use course materials or to
create derivative works from them under the theory of implied license. 206
[56] Of course, professors may also gain full ownership by contract or
by university policy. Nevertheless, contracts and policies cannot vest
authorship in the professor, rather than in the university, for the purpose of
termination rights. 207 Yet termination rights are largely irrelevant for
course materials, since course materials are rarely assigned to third parties
and are generally of little value thirty-five years after their creation.
B. Prong Two: The Position of the Creator
[57] The second issue when determining the scope of the teacher
exception is to whom it should apply. At first blush, it might seem
obvious that a "teacher" exception should apply to all teachers, and only to
teachers. However, commentators, rather than courts, apparently coined

204

See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.

205

See, e.g., Bosch v. Ball-Kell, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713, 1722 (C.D. Ill. 2006).

206

See Orit Fischman Afori, Implied License: An Emerging New Standard in Copyright
Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 275, 275 (2009) (proposing an
expansion of the implied license doctrine “to impose norms based on public policy
considerations in order to bring reasonableness into the law of copyright . . . ”).
207

See Wadley & Brown, supra note 123, at 424-25.
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the term "teacher exception" as a simple nametag to describe an
underdeveloped rule of law. Williams, the case that explicitly established
the "teacher exception," made no reference to that term, referring only to
"university lectures." 208 Because so few published opinions exist in the
faculty work-for-hire arena, determining to whom the exception should
apply necessarily falls back on who needs it the most.
[58] The teacher exception should apply to all academic creators whose
positions grant them a traditional expectation of ownership in the scholarly
works they create. While this test might seem vague or unwieldy, its
application is surprisingly straightforward in the vast majority of realworld cases. As discussed throughout the case law and commentary,
professors and the colleges and universities that employ them have
traditionally and near-universally assumed that the professors own the
scholarly works they create. 209 Thus, professors have a traditional
expectation of ownership. There is no evidence of a comparable tradition
for K-12 teachers and their schools, so the teacher exception would not
apply to K-12 teachers. Other categories of academic employees fall
neatly into this dichotomy. There are few borderline cases.

1. K-12 Teachers
[59] The most obvious effect of a “traditional expectation of
ownership” test excludes K-12 teachers. Unlike their higher-education
counterparts, the work-for-hire doctrine should include primary and
secondary school faculty for two broad reasons. First, the arguments
208

See Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 546.

209

See, e.g., Weinstein v. University of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987); Bosch,
80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719-20; Russ VerSteeg, Copyright and the Educational
Process: The Right of Teacher Inception, 75 IOWA L. REV. 381-395 (1990) (“The
Williams court appears to have recognized [the] academic tradition, which . . . assumed
that professors owned the copyrights to their works . . . .”).
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supporting the teacher exception simply apply with little force, if any, in
the K-12 arena. As the Second Circuit noted in Shaul, there is no
academic tradition granting control of creative works to K-12 teachers. 210
Lower-education schools usually assign to their teachers the task of
developing course materials based on curricula dictated by school districts.
K-12 teachers rarely bear any duty to create scholarly works outside of the
classroom context. As with the type-of-work analysis, courts should not
depart from unambiguous statutory language and Supreme Court decree
except in the most compelling of cases. The K-12 setting is not one of
those cases.
[60] Second, the teacher exception should exclude K-12 teachers as
they generally do not need it in the first place. K-12 teachers’ interests in
the scholarly works they create are usually adequately protected by agency
law’s “scope of employment” rules. 211 This principle is borne out by
Pavlica, where the court aligned with Hays in acknowledging that the
plaintiff, a high school teacher, could have ownership of a teaching
manual he wrote without any involvement from his school. 212 While a
survey of primary and secondary school teachers might indicate a
widespread belief that they own the materials they write for their schools,
there is no apparent reason why they would hold that belief more strongly
than members of non-teaching professions. More importantly, K-12
teachers have not traditionally relied on an assumption of ownership to
create a vast network of property and contractual rights, as have their
counterparts on the university campus.

210

See Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 186 (2d Cir.
2004).

211

See id. at 186; Pavlica v. Behr, 397 F. Supp. 2d 519, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

212

See Pavlica, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
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2. Non-teaching University Faculty, Students, and
Other Academics
[61] Under the proposed “traditional expectation” test, the "teacher"
exception would expand to include many types of employees on the
university campus aside from teachers. Many universities employ nonteaching faculty and postdoctoral fellows. Some universities allow their
professors to “buy out” their teaching responsibilities if they bring in
sufficient research funding from external sources. 213 Many research
professors and postdoctoral fellows have as their sole duty the
responsibility to “publish or perish,” that is, to conduct research and create
written works for publication. 214 Universities also employ students, both
at the graduate and undergraduate level; those students often contribute to
scholarly articles written by their faculty advisors. Some of them even
write articles of their own within the scope of their employment duties.
To exclude non-teaching faculty, postdoctoral fellows, students, and other
such academics from the teacher exception would defy common sense and
the policies upon which the teacher exception is based. There is no less of
an academic tradition granting ownership of creative works to these types
of positions than to teaching faculty. Moreover, academic freedom does
not stop at the classroom door; all academic researchers and commentators
need the same leeway to publish and to communicate free from university
control. A professor who buys out her teaching duties should not
unwittingly lose her right to control the articles or textbooks she writes.
[62] The extension of the teacher exception to non-teaching faculty
would have flipped the ownership of the cattle-imaging software in Rouse
213

See, e.g., BOSTON COLLEGE, PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT FACULTY HANDBOOK 19-21
(2011), available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/cas_sites/psych/pdf/
faculty_ handbook.pdf; WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT OF ACADEMIC YEAR RESEARCH
SALARY 1 (2011), available at http://www.wfu.edu/rsp/pdf/acadyrsalary1-31-11.pdf.
214

See Klein, supra note 25, at 166.
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to the professors. 215 That would have been the proper result in that case
because it may have enabled the plaintiffs to keep some control of the
software and prevented the software’s use by one of the defendants, a
private consultant, without the plaintiffs’ consent. There is no principled
reason why the research professors’ control over their software should
have turned on whether they had held any teaching responsibilities on the
side. Indeed, in light of this, the “teacher exception” should properly be
renamed the “academic exception,” as it is already called in a handful of
court decisions and commentaries. 216
VI. CONCLUSION
[63] This article has aimed to advance discussion about academic workfor-hire issues in light of a new generation of court decisions in the new
millennium. These decisions have debunked the previous conventional
wisdom that the teacher exception to the work-for-hire doctrine was
effectively dead. The advent of termination rights and changes in
technology, distance education, and university economics will lead to
increasing litigation on the issue, and courts must consider not only
whether the teacher exception should continue to exist, but in what form
and scope. This article’s proposal for a two-part test for the exception
aims to balance the binding force of statutory law and Supreme Court
precedent against the compelling policies under which courts originally
215

See Rouse v. Walter & Assocs., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1065 (S.D. Iowa 2007)
(holding, instead, that the University owned the cattle-imagery software under the workfor-hire doctrine).
216

See Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 186 (2d Cir.
2004); Pittsburgh St. Univ. / Kan. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Kan. Bd. of Regents / Pittsburgh
St. Univ., 280 Kan. 408, 423 (2005) (using “academic exception” and “teacher
exception” interchangeably); Klein, supra note 25, at 167-69 (“For several reasons, it
appears more likely that the academic exception has not survived the revisions of the
Copyright Act.”); Corynne McSherry, WHO OWNS ACADEMIC WORK?: BATTLING FOR
CONTROL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 107 (2001); Wadley & Brown, supra note 123, at
430-31.
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established the exception. It recognizes that, based on those compelling
policies, the so-called “teacher” exception should properly be called an
academic exception and should apply to scholarly works, but not to course
materials or administrative works. Furthermore, it should apply to
teachers, as well as to non-teaching academics, including university
researchers and graduate students. This realignment of the exception
could open up a whole new world of possibilities for people in these
positions and advance the interests of academic freedom and scholarly
innovation.
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